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Changing coalitions in social policy reforms: the politics of new
social needs and demands
Abstract
Recent reforms in Swiss and German old-age insurance and family policy included elements directed at
both ‘old' and ‘new' social needs. ‘Old risks', such as old age and unemployment, are   mainly covered
by income-related insurance schemes for standard industrial breadwinners. By contrast, ‘new' needs,
such as infrastructure   to reconcile work and care or insurance of atypical employment biographies,
concern mainly ‘new' risk groups, such as young people or women. While   reforms directed at ‘old
risks' mainly focused on cost containment, ‘new' social policies aimed at gender equality or the increase
of labour-market participation. In this article, I argue that the emergence of modernizing policies
covering new social needs leads to new conflict lines in social policy making, which differ from the
distributional class conflict. Instead, I expect value coalitions and cross-class alliances on these policies.
In   addition, I argue that in a consensus-democratic institutional context, such new alliances form more
easily. These hypotheses are tested with reference to recent   reforms in pension and family policy in
Germany and Switzerland. Coalition dynamics are examined by means of process analysis and
multidimensional scaling. Empirical  evidence largely confirms the hypotheses, but also points out the
need for further differentiation of policies covering new social needs.
Key Words: family policy • Germany • new politics • new social risks • pension policy • Switzerland
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Abstract 
 
Recent reforms in Swiss and German old age insurance and family policy included elements 
directed both at “old” and “new” social needs. “Old risks”, such as old age and unemployment 
are mainly covered by income-related insurance schemes for standard industrial 
breadwinners. By contrast, “new” needs, such as infrastructure to reconcile work and care or 
insurance of atypical employment biographies concern mainly “new” risk groups, such as the 
young or women. While reforms directed at “old risks” mainly focused on cost containment, 
“new” social policies aimed at gender equality or the increase of labour market participation.  
In this article, I argue that the emergence of modernising policies covering new social needs 
leads to new conflict lines in social policy-making, which differ from the distributional class-
conflict. Instead, I expect value coalitions and cross-class alliances on these policies. In 
addition, I argue that in a consensus-democratic institutional context, such new alliances form 
more easily. These hypotheses are tested for recent reforms in pension and family policy in 
Germany and Switzerland. Coalitional dynamics are examined by means of process analysis 
and multi-dimensional scaling. Empirical evidence largely confirms the hypotheses, but also 
points out the need for further differentiation of policies covering new social needs.       
 
 
Keywords: new politics, new social risks, pension policy, family policy, Germany, 
Switzerland 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this article, I examine how new or newly recognised social needs and demands translate 
into policy change in Christian Democratic welfare states. New social demands result from 
the shift away from the industrial society, which was based on standard industrial 
employment, stable family structures and the social insurance of male breadwinners. 
Demands for new, modernising social policies such as child care infrastructure and social 
protection of parenthood and atypical employment rank increasingly high on the reform 
agendas of these welfare states. In this article, I ask whether the political conflict lines in 
these “new” social policy reforms differ from those observed on “old” issues. In other words, 
I ask whether the new social policies are supported by particular “new” alliances of actors.  
As I will show below, there are theoretical arguments, which suggest such a change, notably 
the increasing emergence of social-liberal value alliances, and of alliances between labour 
and capital for reforms enabling labour market participation. Moreover, I argue that the 
reconfiguration of alliances in the policy process is mediated by the national institutional 
framework of decision-making, so that the chances for “new”, modernising coalitions are 
higher in consensus democracies than in majoritarian systems.  
 
Such reconfigurations of actor alliances have been identified in various case studies. Cross-
class coalitions of employers, liberals and the left on modernising social policies occurred in 
reforms on child care infrastructure and occupational pensions for part-time workers (see 
Ballestri and Bonoli 2003, Daguerre 2003, Häusermann 2002, Kübler and Papadopoulos 
2003). Value coalitions between Social Democrats and liberal parties on gender equality 
policies have been observed in reforms of old age and maternity insurance (see Meyer 1998, 
Häusermann et al. 2004, Martin 2002). Yet, while providing detailed analyses of specific 
reform processes, these case studies often lack a comprehensive theoretical framework 
explaining whether these new coalitions represent mere exceptions, a certain blurring of 
traditional coalitions without new patterns being established, or a new trend towards a 
profound restructuring of conflict lines in the field of social policy. This article aims at 
providing a theoretical framework and suggests a systematic analytical strategy for the 
analysis of the politics of new social needs and demands.  
The hypotheses on changing reform coalitions are tested empirically on the basis of four 
pension and family policy reforms in Switzerland and Germany. These policies are affected 
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by the emergence of new social needs and demands, while being under a parallel pressure for 
retrenchment. Hence they allow the comparison of the politics of “old” as compared to “new” 
social policy issues. Germany and Switzerland fit in a “most similar system design” strategy 
of comparison. Indeed, while it is true that Switzerland has a rather liberal labour market 
regime, both countries belong to the model of employment-related and highly stratifying 
Christian Democratic welfare states with regard to pension and family policy. In these welfare 
regimes, policies directed at new social needs and demands are particularly underdeveloped 
(Bonoli 2004). The two countries differ, however, to a certain extent with respect to the 
institutional framework of decision-making. In Switzerland, all major parties are represented 
in the oversized coalition-government. While this - as well as the threat of an optional popular 
referendum at the end of the process - makes policy-making highly consensus-oriented, it also 
allows the parties to defend autonomous positions in parliament and to build alliances among 
them rather flexibly, depending on the specific policy proposal under debate. Germany, by 
contrast, displays a more majoritarian logic of party competition in the parliamentary realm. 
Even though the government has to negotiate consensus with the opposition on certain 
policies and under certain circumstances (i.e. if the opposition holds the majority of seats in 
the Bundesrat, the federal chamber), the relation between the two main parties (Union and 
SPD) is much more adversarial than in Switzerland, because they compete for power in the 
next elections (at federal or at national level). This bipolarism implies stronger party 
discipline in parliament and more restricted possibilities for variable and flexible alliance 
formation.  
 
The article is structured as follows: I first discuss the concept of new social needs and 
demands and the theoretical arguments that let me expect changes in the policy positions of 
the main actors. Follows a presentation of case selection and the methodological strategy. 
Results on the selected cases of reforms are presented in the final chapter.  
 
2. A multidimensional policy space: changing values and preferences  
 
The cogency of the categorization of new, in contrast to old social policy issues lies at the 
centre of controversial debates in the literature (see, for instance, Bonoli 2003 and 2004, 
Taylor-Gooby 2003, Esping-Andersen 1999 and 1999b, Huber and Stephens 2003). In the 
context of increasing budgetary pressure, most of the welfare reforms during the last decades 
were focused on cost containment or even retrenchment (Huber and Stephens 2001). At the 
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same time, however, these countries are experiencing since the 1970s the transition to post-
industrial social structures, characterised by the massive entry of women into the labour 
market, unstable family structures and growing flexibility of the labour market relations, but 
also by value changes according higher importance to gender equality, individualisation and 
free lifestyle choices. These changes create a wide range of “new” social needs for expanded 
welfare provision, such as infrastructure for the conciliation of work and family, improved old 
age insurance for employees with atypical labour contracts, etc. (Bleses and Seelaib-Kaiser 
2004). Even if no common definition of “new social risks” is agreed upon, all the 
abovementioned authors argue that a distinct set of social needs and risks typically appears 
more intensely in post-industrial economies. These welfare risks stem in the first place from 
changes – or failures (Esping-Andersen 1999: 145) - in family and labour market structures. 
Stable family structures are eroding and gender roles are changing. Similarly, stable 
employment relations in the labour market are losing importance compared to interrupted 
employment biographies and atypical work contracts.  
Hence, following a broad definition, I call modernising social policies those measures that 
target a problem stemming from changes in the traditional family or employment structures. 
Pierson identifies three categories of welfare reforms: cost containment, re-commodification 
and recalibration (Pierson 2001: 419ff). This distinction is most helpful for deriving the main 
goals of contemporary social policy reforms: 1) the increase of labour market participation, 2) 
gender equality and individualisation, 3) poverty alleviation or 4) cost containment. 
Modernising social policies mainly pursue one or several of the first three goals, whereas 
“old” social policy reforms are mostly directed at cost containment.  
 
2.1. The “new” politics of welfare state expansion 
 
How do different theories of welfare policy development conceive social policy making in the 
era of retrenchment and post-industrialism since the beginning of the 1970s?  
The most influential theoretical stream is the power resources approach. It explains the size 
of national welfare states by the strength of trade unions and Social Democratic parties (see 
e.g. Stephens 1979, Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 1990). The welfare state is seen as a 
“triumph of the interests of the working class” (Baldwin 1990: 41), policy-making being 
dominated by class conflict. It is argues that the power resources explanation still holds in the 
post-industrial era (Korpi and Palme 2003). The context of austerity is supposed to strengthen 
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capital at the expense of labour. The approach thus expects welfare retrenchment to the extent 
of the shifts in the power balance between capital and labour.  
On the other hand, it has been shown that continental European welfare states are not only the 
result of  the strength of labour, but have also been shaped by a social-conservative alliance of 
Social Democrats and Catholic parties (van Kersbergen 1995). With the strengthening of 
capital and in the context of austerity and post-industrialism, this alliance might be expected 
to fail and a certain retrenchment of these welfare states would become likely. 
 
Other studies, however, focus less on retrenchment and more on stability. They try to explain 
why national welfare states remain so stable (Huber and Stephens 2001, Scharpf and Schmidt 
1999). Two explanations for this stability deal with the topic of this article, i.e. the evolution 
of coalitional dynamics:  
A first explanation is given by authors of the “Varieties of capitalism”-approach. They argue 
that research should analyse more closely not only unions’ but also employers’ preferences 
(see e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001, Mares 2003, similarly Swenson 2002 and Baldwin 1990). It 
is shown that sector-specific divergence within business and unions and cross-class coalitions 
have often been decisive in the formation of welfare states. Consequently, these authors 
maintain that while capital may be strengthened in the context of austerity, this does not 
necessarily lead to retrenchment (Hall and Soskice 2001, Manow 2001). Several empirical 
studies indeed identify cross-class coalitions in favour of certain social policies (e.g. 
Ebbinghaus 2001, Mares 2000 and 2001, Thelen 2000).  
The second explanation of stability in national welfare policies focuses on political parties. 
Huber and Stephens (2001) as well as Pierson (1996, 2001) identified changing patterns of 
party preferences: programmatic differences become smaller compared to the times of welfare 
state expansion, because all parties have to implement some retrenchment in the “old” 
schemes. At the same time, however, cuts are blocked by constituencies of beneficiaries. 
Hence, the new reform coalitions mainly oppose large partisan coalitions to welfare 
constituencies.      
 
Drawing on this literature, I identify several theoretical arguments for the formation of new  
value and interest coalitions across parties, trade unions and business on new social needs and 
demands:  
• First of all, the weakening of traditional class structure and the perspectives of a 
forthcoming shortage of skilled labour accentuate the blurring of the class conflict. 
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Employers, for instance, are supposed to become more favourable to policies increasing 
female labour market participation, seeing their interest coincide with claims from 
feminists and the left. 
• Secondly, the emergence of new actors in social policy-making (Pierson 2001) provides 
opportunities for changing alliances. Since the victims of new social needs (notably young 
families and female workers) do not belong to the traditional clientele of parties and trade 
unions (Bonoli 2004, Ebbinghaus 2003), actors such as women’s or family organisations 
may become more important.    
• Finally, the “distributive” labour-capital-divide is further weakened by the emergence of a 
new “communitarian” value-cleavage between libertarian and authoritarian values 
(Kitschelt 1994). Libertarians tend to privilege participation, individualisation, gender 
equality etc., while authoritarians remain attached to traditional family values and 
communitarian structures. I argue that this value-conflict not only structures the national 
party spaces, as Kitschelt demonstrated, but even more specifically the political space of 
social policy-making. Hence, coalitional dynamics would be multidimensional, displaying 
a “libertarian-traditionalist” value dimension in addition to the socio-economic 
“distributional” conflict. I argue that the new value-conflict becomes particularly relevant 
in policy-making on new social needs and demands, since these often aim not only at 
material redistribution, but also at gender equality and individualisation. In a somewhat 
similar vein, Bleses and Seelaib-Kaiser (2004) identify the rise of new dominant 
“interpretative patterns” among social policy makers in Germany, inducing a departure 
from the male-breadwinner model towards improved infrastructure and free choice for 
families. Hence, new value-alliances may differ from the traditional coalitions over 
welfare state building.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses on reconfiguration of reform coalitions 
 
For the analysis of actor configurations in decision-making processes, it must be distinguished 
between “issue alliances”, i.e. actors with similar positions on specific elements of a reform 
and the actual “reform coalitions” on the whole reform packages at the end of the policy 
process. A reform package usually comprises several reform issues. I distinguish them, 
because I assume that the formation of reform coalitions is more influenced by the national 
institutional context of decision-making, while the positions of actors in issue-alliances derive 
from social and economic structural determinants.  
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With regard to the formation of  issue alliances, I have the same hypotheses for Germany and 
Switzerland, since both countries are similar with regard to social and economic structural 
change (Oesch 2003). Tertiarisation has increased massively but the female full time labour 
market participation is low. The conciliation of work and family tasks remains difficult in 
both countries. At the same time, both countries experience similar demographic problems, 
i.e. most of all a very low birth rate (less than 1,4 children per woman) (Gerlach 2004). 
Furthermore, a shortage of skilled labour for demographic reasons has already appeared 
(Jaumotte 2003, Reinberg and Hummel 2003, Fuchs 2003, Wanner and Ferrari 2001). The 
improvement of career opportunities for women has therefore appeared on the agenda of 
employers’ organisations (1). In this context of low birth rates, female demand for work 
opportunities and projections of labour shortage, I suppose a convergence of interests between 
labour and capital : Cross-class alliances between employers and the left (trade unions, Social 
Democrats) will form on measures aiming at the conciliation of work and care. 
 
Work-life-balance issues are part of a broader set of policies oriented towards 
individualisation and recognition of various family forms. For this overall orientation – not 
necessarily linked to female labour market participation – value changes are particularly 
relevant. Several studies have analysed how the libertarian-traditionalist divide has structured 
party electorates in Germany and Switzerland. The “communitarian” axis in Germany 
(Kitschelt 1994: 168-9) opposes diametrically the Green Party and the Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU), with the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Free Democrats (FDP) placed in the 
middle at about the same level of libertarian values. On the socio-economic “distributional” 
axis, however, polarisation remains among the “old” blocks of bourgeois FDP/CDU/CSU and 
the SPD/Greens. A similar picture is drawn for Switzerland by Kitschelt and McGann (2003). 
While the libertarian-traditionalist value axis opposes mainly the Green Party (GPS) and the 
Social Democrats (SPS) to the national-conservative Swiss Peoples’ Party (SVP), the Free 
Democrats (FDP) and the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) are situated in between them. On 
the distributional dimension, however, the SVP and the FDP form a clear anti-interventionist 
block that opposes the SPS and the Greens, with the CVP in the middle. Hence, it is mostly 
the liberal party electorates that are positioned differently on the two axes, which opens new 
opportunities for alliance-building: I expect the occurrence of libertarian value coalitions 
between liberal and leftist actors on issues favouring gender equality, individualisation and 
free lifestyle choices.  
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The effect of a difficult economic context on alliance-formation is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the “distributional” labour-capital dimension could be strengthened, which would 
impede alliances for increased coverage of new social needs. On the other hand, however, the 
reverse could happen. Indeed, Bonoli (2003: 18) points out that policies extending coverage 
on new social risks are generally less expensive than “old risk” schemes, not least because 
they are often “commodifying”. Hence, even employers could strategically support them in 
order to build reform packages that combine expanded coverage of new social risks with 
restrictive elements in the old welfare schemes, i.e. political exchange for modernising 
compromises (Bonoli 2003: 17 and 1999; see also Pierson 2001: 427  and Weaver 2003: 
35ff.).   
 
While the hypotheses on the formation of issue alliances are largely identical for Germany 
and Switzerland, I assume systematic differences with regard to reform coalitions at the end 
of the decisional processes. Indeed, the institutional design of the German decision-making 
process is less favourable to flexible coalition-building than the Swiss, because it is more 
majoritarian and bipolar (see above for more details). The institutional constraints in Germany 
require homogeneous positions of the main parties in parliament and foster polarisation 
between them. Therefore, even if new alliances on modernising social policies may form, I 
expect these alliances to break up in the latter course of the decision-making process. The 
actors would then realign on the “traditional” distributional left-right reform coalitions. In 
Switzerland, by contrast, the institutional context allows for more flexibility in the formation 
of issue-alliances and even reform coalitions. Therefore, I assume that in Germany, “new” 
and flexible modernising reform coalitions are less likely than in Switzerland.  
 
3. Case selection and methods 
 
These hypotheses are tested on the basis of four major reforms in the fields of German and 
Swiss pension and family policy. The reforms include “old” as well as “new” social policy 
issues and hence allow the comparison between the different actor constellations.  
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3.1. Switzerland: selected reform issues 
 
The 10th reform of the Swiss basic pension scheme of 1995 was aimed at introducing gender 
equality in a system that had formerly privileged the insurance of the male breadwinner. The 
element of the reform which I qualify as modernising policy, because it pursued the goals of 
gender equality, individualisation and poverty alleviation for new risk categories is the 
introduction of equal splitting of contributions and benefits between husbands and wives 
(combined with contribution credits for care). On the other hand, the debate on a rise in the 
age of retirement was largely a debate over cost containment, hence I would qualify it as old 
social policy issue. Finally, the reform was about the flexibilisation of the age of retirement: 
This final issue cannot easily be qualified as old or new social policy demand, because it is 
about the distributional issue of the age of retirement, but at the same time, it is a new claim to 
individualise retirement.  
 
The second reform, the law on the introduction of a maternity insurance of 1999, might seem 
somewhat outdated, but no such federal insurance existed in Switzerland. Hence, for 
Switzerland, maternity insurance is indeed a new social demand. The governmental proposal 
contained firstly an income replacement insurance for women active on the labour market, 
financed by means of wage contributions equally split between employers and employees. 
Secondly, a general tax-financed birth benefit of about 3000 Euro, granted independently of 
labour market participation. Finally, the bill wanted to grant similar benefits to parents in case 
of adoption. All three issues belong to the category of new social policy issues, since they 
favour working women and / or support individual lifestyle choices.  
 
3.2. Germany: selected reform issues 
 
The third case is the German pension reform of 1992 (RRG 1992, see also Meyer 1998 and 
Nullmeier/Rüb 1993 for a detailed account of this reform). Five reform issues were directed at 
the coverage of new social needs and demands: First, the bill proposed to extend the pension 
credits for educational tasks from one to three years. Moreover, these three years should 
newly be credited as contribution years (Beitragszeiten). Aside these measures rewarding 
educational tasks, the minimum pension for low wage earners was extended, improving 
notably the situation of female part-time employees. Fourthly, a more generous coverage of 
the interruption of labour market participation was included and finally, the introduction of a 
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more flexible retirement age can also be counted among the new social policy issues. Two 
additional reform-elements belong to the category of old social policy issues, namely a de 
facto (2) increase in the formal age of retirement from 60/63 to 65 for men and women and 
the indexation of the pension level depending newly on net instead of gross wage increases.  
 
Finally, the reform of the German law on educational benefits of 2000 (BEGG 2000) 
explicitly aimed at improving the work-care-balance and at “modernising” the German family 
policy (see also Gerlach 2004 for a detailed account of the development of German family 
policy). All contested reform elements can be categorised as new social policy issues. First, 
the government proposed to extend educational benefits to more households. Second, two 
measures were directed at work-care-balance and gender equality. On the one hand, the bill 
introduced an individual right to part-time employment in case of parental leave. On the other 
hand, the bill contained a flexibilisation of parental leave, since parents could newly stretch 
the leave over a longer time span. Third, two instruments aimed at increasing and accelerating 
parents’ labour market participation: A new scheme proposed financial incentives to shorten 
the parental leave to one year instead of two. Finally, the allowed working time for parents on 
parental leave should be raised from 19 to 30 hours per week. All five modernising issues 
differed mostly in their orientation to rewarding either labour market participation, or – 
conversely – educational tasks.  
 
3.3. Data and methods 
 
In analysing these reforms, I have proceeded in two steps: 
In a first step, I retraced the decision-making procedures by means of secondary literature and 
primary sources such as governmental reports, parliamentary debates, reports on consultation 
procedures, etc. 
In a second step - in order to systematize the rich qualitative data - I have coded the positions 
of the actors on four aspects of the reforms: 1) whether the actor was favourable to state 
intervention or not, 2) whether the social policy intervention should apply to all citizens 
(universal coverage) or only to parts of them, 3) whether benefits should be high or low and 
4) whether the intervention should occur at the level of the federal state or at some sublevel. 
For each reform-issue and for all actors, these positions have been coded on a scale from 0 to 
2, 0 meaning the “least generous” policy instrument (non-intervention, low benefits, low 
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range of insured people, etc) and 2 the “most generous” solution (universal, tax-financed, 
high-benefit intervention).  
For the identification of actors’ positions, I have relied on the responses to the official 
consultation procedure (Switzerland), the official statements in the public hearings before the 
parliamentary commission (Germany), press statements of the actors and parliamentary 
debates. For the few cases, for which such sources were unavailable, I used previous research 
(Senti 1994, Häusermann et al. 2004, Bonoli 1999, Martin 2002, Meyer 1998) and press 
articles.  
I have then averaged the positions for each reform issue over the four aspects and analysed 
this data by multidimensional scaling (MDS with PROXSCAL in SPSS 11.0). This scaling 
method displays actors and issues spatially. The graphs should be read as follows: the 
distances between an actor and an issue represents the “generosity” that the actor advocates 
on the specific issue. An actor located closely to an issue, for example, claims extensive 
coverage, while more distant actors advocate restrictive positions. Hence those actors which 
share a similar distance towards a same issue (regardless of the distance between the actors 
themselves) advocate the same position on this issue and – thus – form an issue alliance. 
Issue-alliances thus do not depend on the distances between the actors, but on their respective 
distances from an issue in the two-dimensional policy space. For an easier understanding, I 
have highlighted the issue-alliances with ellipses in the graphs.  
 
4. Empirical evidence on coalition reconfiguration 
 
The empirical findings confirm my hypotheses on issue-alliances with regard to several 
elements of the analysed reforms.  
 
4.1. Policy dynamics in Switzerland: fragmentation on the left and the right 
 
The hypotheses on the formation of social-liberal, “libertarian” value alliances on reforms 
promoting gender equality, individualisation and female labour market participation are 
largely confirmed.  
 
Pension policy 
In Switzerland, the introduction of individualised splitting of contributions and benefits in the 
10th reform of the basic pension scheme was supported not only by the trade unions (SGB), 
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the Social Democratic Party (SPS) and womens’ associations, but also by the liberal Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), the liberal party (LPS) and the main employers associations from 
the export-oriented sectors of the Swiss economy (Economiesuisse, Union of Swiss 
Employers Associations SAV). As expected, they opposed an alliance of the conservative 
parties (Christian Democratic Party CVP, protestant party EVP and Swiss people’s party 
SVP) and the employers association of the Small Businesses (SGV). These more socially 
conservative actors advocated the maintenance of the common couple pension. Hence, on this 
modernising, new social policy reform element, a social-liberal value coalition faced a more 
conservative front. A similar conflict structure appeared on the issue of publicly subsidized 
flexibilisation of the retirement age. Even though a large social-liberal consensus emerged on 
the desirability of this flexibilisation, the employers associations and the conservative parties 
nevertheless supported a somewhat more restrained financial support for early retirement.  
With regard to the “old” social policy issue – the level of the age of retirement - , however, a 
traditional, “distributional” class conflict structured the policy space: while the right, i.e. the 
employers associations, the conservative as well as the liberal parties (FDP, SVP, LPS)  
advocated a rise in the age of retirement, the trade unions (SGB) and the left-wing parties 
(SPS, Green Party, EVP) instead demanded to lower the retirement age for men.  
 
This formation of issue-alliances and actor constellations is illustrated in the multidimensional 
scaling. The actors positions can be adequately represented in a two-dimensional space:  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The scaling displays the “liberal” cluster of actors in the upper right corner (liberal parties, 
employers’ associations of large business), the group of actors with a more conservative 
position towards the lower right corner (conservative parties, small business employers) and 
the group of left-wing actors towards the upper left corner (Social Democrats and Green 
Party, trade unions) (for the interpretation of the MDS-graphs, see the guidelines at the end of 
paragraph 3.3). As expected, the left-wing and the liberal actors are located closely, i.e. 
favourably, to the modernising issues (splitting and flexibilisation, upper ellipse), while the 
conservative actors, as well as the government were opposed to splitting and flexibilisation, 
but in favour of a generous solution in terms of the age of retirement. On this latter issue, a 
distributional conflict between the left and the traditional right (liberal and conservative 
actors, ellipse on the right) appears on the graph.  
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As this graph shows clearly, the combination of old and new social policy issues in a single 
reform package has contributed to form a two-dimensional policy space, with the potential for 
new reform opportunities. I hypothesized that the consensual Swiss institutional framework 
presents favourable conditions, so that these opportunities could actually lead to new reform 
coalitions. Indeed, we observe a de-alignment of distributional left-right coalitions in the 
pension reform. The reform package, combining “old” and “new” social policy issues was in 
fact strategically tied up by the right wing actors (Häusermann et al. 2000, Bonoli 2001). 
Indeed, it deeply divided the left into a “trade unionist wing” making the opposition against 
the retirement issue their top priority and a “partisan” left according more weight to social  
modernisation, i.e. splitting. Hence, the Social Democrats and the Green Party supported the 
entire package at the end of the negotiation process, while the unions rejected it. The reform-
coalitions then formed as follows:  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
This reform shows that the introduction of a value-dimension in the reform – in addition to 
the distributional dimension - led to a reconfiguration of issue-alliances and reform-coalitions.  
 
Family policy 
The multidimensionality of the policy space is less plain to see in the case of the federal 
maternity insurance, because all issues at stake were new social policies. Hence, I expected a 
social-liberal coalition, as well as employers’ support for those measures enabling female 
labour market participation.  
On the issue of income insurance, almost all actors agreed that this risk should be covered. 
Heavy opposition against the governmental proposal came, however, from the employers’ 
associations (SGV, SAV) and – to a minor extent – from the Free Democratic Party (FDP), 
the conservative Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Liberal Party who argued that having 
children was a private, not a public affair. The opposition of the employers against the 
maternity insurance contradicts my hypothesis, according to which the employers would be 
interested in measures favouring female labour market participation. However, their 
opposition was not as profound: their main argument against federal maternity insurance was 
that this risk was already covered at the level of industries (collective agreements) and firms, 
and that it must not be financed with additional wage contributions. Hence, they rejected the 
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income insurance because of the mode of financing, but did not oppose the actual coverage of 
the risk as such.  
On the issue of birth benefits, a similar configuration could be observed. While almost all 
parties as well as the trade unions supported the birth benefits, the employers (mainly the 
SAV, but also the more conservative SGV) strongly rejected this part of the bill proposal. 
This is easily explained, since this policy instrument does not contribute to the enabling of 
labour market participation, but is rather a recognition of motherhood as such as a socially 
valuable task. On the issue of granting adoptive parents the same benefits, liberal, 
conservative  and left-wing actors alike claimed that the issue should not be mixed up with 
income insurance. There was an overall consensus on the rejection of this reform element in 
this reform.  
Hence, on this bill proposal, conflict lines were blurred and the main debate was about the 
organisation and the financing of the new income insurance scheme. Accordingly, the MDS 
shows no clear “camps” but interesting differences with regard to different modernising issues 
(for interpretation guidelines, see end of paragraph 3.3).   
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The graph shows a large number of actors close to the issues of income insurance and birth 
benefits (single ellipse) and the employers (SAV, SGV) and some right-wing actors (EDU, 
LPS) in a larger distance. Hence, an overall consensus on the coverage of income insurance 
and birth benefits can be observed with regard to the acceptance of coverage. We see, 
however, also, that while the Social Democratic and the Labour Party (SPS and PDA) were 
equally favourable to birth benefits and to income insurance, the more conservative actors 
(SVP, BSV, FDP) are clearly closer to the birth benefits than to income insurance, which 
would favour female labour market participation. Nevertheless, the main result from this 
scaling is the absence of a clear conflict line between the “distributional” left and right. 
Rather, left and right parties, as well as trade unions are very close, with only the employers 
in opposition.  
As hypothesized with regard to the Swiss institutional framework, this led to unusual conflict 
structure also in the subsequent referendum campaign: Contrary to the pension issue, the 
maternity insurance bill divided not the left, but the right. While the employers’ associations 
rejected the reform mostly because of the inclusion of birth benefits and because of the wage-
based financing, the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CVP) accepted the reform. The 
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Free Democratic Party (FDP) was deeply divided: while the majority of party sections allied 
with the employers against the reform, not less than 7 cantonal sections of the party took 
position in favour of the bill. In addition, the women’s section of the FDP, the Liberal Party 
(otherwise close to the employers) and even two cantonal sections of the national-
conservative Swiss People’s Party (SVP) supported the project together with the unified left. 
The unusual reform coalitions are summarized in table 2:  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
A further indicator of the blurring of conflict lines is the fact that in 2001, i.e. shortly after the 
rejection of the reform in a popular vote in 1999, a parliamentary initiative for maternity 
insurance was launched by representatives of all four governing parties (FDP, CVP, SP, SVP) 
together with the director of the Employers Union of Small Businesses (SGV). The new bill 
included only income replacement and soon got large support, even from the employers, 
except for sectors that have a very weak female labour force rate (construction). Uniting this 
large social-liberal coalition, the new bill was accepted by the people in 2004. 
 
 4.1. Policy dynamics in Germany: selective alliance formation by the 
government  
 
Pension policy 
The governmental bill proposal on the German pension reform of 1992 came in parliament 
already as a compromise between the governing FDP/CDU/CSU and the opposition (SPD). 
However, as in the 10th reform of the Swiss basic pension scheme, the German Social 
Democrats only reluctantly consented to this reform and only agreed because of the 
“modernising” elements on gender equality. Consequently, the reform led to a certain 
fragmentation of the left between the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions: In fact, 
for the SPD, the extended coverage of new social needs (educational benefits, contribution 
credits, flexibilisation) was so important that they even accepted an increase in the age of 
retirement and the net wage indexation of pensions. The trade unions (DGB, DBB, DAG) and 
the Greens also advocated increased protection of educational tasks, but accorded more 
weight to the distributional issues of retirement age and pension indexation. Hence, the trade 
unions largely turned the overall bill proposal down, even if they principally agreed with the 
modernising elements. The employers (BDA, ZDH, ULA), on the other hand, were rather 
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indifferent towards the modernising elements, but they strongly claimed an increase in the age 
of retirement and net wage indexation. Hence, CDU/CSU and FDP made concessions to the 
SPD in terms of new social policy instruments to impose restrictive reforms on the age of 
retirement and pension indexation. The following graph displays this actor constellation (see 
end of paragraph 3.3. for interpretation guidelines): 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
One can clearly identify the “middle” block of trade unions (DAG, DBB, DAG) and the 
Green Party almost equally close to the increase in the age of retirement and the coverage of 
educational tasks, which means that they advocated “generous” policies for both issues. The 
SPD, however, is situated more clearly near the new social policy issues. As for the block of 
employers in the lower left corner, their main claim was for an increase in the age of 
retirement and net wage indexation (large distance from these issues, together with the 
CDU/CSU and FDP, ellipse on the left). In addition, we see the agreement of SPD, FDP, 
CDU/CSU and the unions on the issues of flexibilisation, educational benefits and the 
increase of minimum pensions (upper ellipse). 
To underline the importance of the social-liberal value coalition that was able to build the 
reform package, let me point to a common claim raised by the FDP and SPD. Both parties – 
together with the Greens – demanded a complete splitting of contributions and benefits in the 
old age insurance between husband and wife. In addition, both claimed educational benefits 
not only to inactive, but also to working mothers mothers. The CDU/CSU, however, opposed 
these claims on the basis of a more conservative idea of family structure. That the benefits 
were only targeted at women inactive on the labour market may also explain the absence of 
employers’ support. In sum, we observe again that the issues related to gender equality and 
individualisation has allowed new partisan value coalitions that differ from the traditional 
left-right conflict. This distributional conflict, on the other hand, is still most clearly displayed 
by the opposition between employers and trade unions.  
 
Despite the new issue-alliances, I expected the alignment of the German actors on 
distributional reform coalitions separating the left (SPD and trade unions) from the right 
(CDU/CSU, FDP and employers) because of the more majoritarian German institutional 
framework. This hypothesis, however, is not confirmed in the pension reform. In this case, the 
compromise on the draft bill submitted to parliament by the CDU/CSU/FDP government and 
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the SPD opposition held up until the end of the parliamentary negotiations. Hence, the final 
vote in parliament opposed these three parties to the Greens (table 3). The expected 
distributional conflict occurred however heavily between the  employers accepting the reform 
and the trade unions rejecting it.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Family policy 
All elements of the German law on educational benefits (BEGG 2000) can be counted among 
new social policy issues. Nevertheless, the governing SPD/Greens again forged various 
alliances for different elements of the reform package. On the most “classical” distributive 
issue, the increase of the educational benefits, the SPD/Greens gathered the support of 
CDU/CSU and the family organisations (Deutscher Familienverband), who claimed even 
higher benefit increases. Defending a traditional family structure, the improvement of the 
financial transfers was the most important aspect of the reform for these conservative actors, 
whereas they opposed measures increasing labour market participation of parents, namely the 
financial incentives to shorten parental leave and the increase in the allowed working time 
during parental leave from 19 to 30 hours per week. On these modernising elements, however, 
an issue-alliance between the employers (ZDH and – to a somewhat lesser extent - BDA) and 
the red-green government became possible. Hence, while on the one hand the governing 
parties agreed with the employers on these labour market participation incentives, they were 
on the other hand able to foster an alliance with the trade unions (DGB), the womens’ 
organisations, the CDU/CSU and the Families’ Organisation on the expansion of parental 
leave generosity. All these actors supported the introduction of a subjective right to part-time 
employment during parental leave and to an extension and flexibilisation of this leave 
scheme. These increasing rights of parents as labour market participants were however 
opposed by the employers, for whom they went too far. The following graph again displays 
these alliances (for interpretation guidelines, see end of paragraph 3.3):  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
We see the issue-alliance of employers and the left on labour-market participation incentives 
in the lower right ellipse. The more conservative actors (CDU/CSU and family organisations) 
rather favour traditional transfer increases of educational benefits, which are also supported 
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by the PDS, the trade unions and the Womens’ Organisations. Furthermore, the graph clearly 
shows the support of CDU/CSU and SPD to part-time employment and flexibilisation of 
parental leave (ellipse on the left) and the opposition of the employers against these issues 
(clearly outside the ellipse). The CDU/CSU was opposed to the employers - their traditional 
right-wing allies - on this issue. Hence, we see that the Social Democratic government was 
able to coalesce with the conservative partisan actors on issues extending the rights of parents 
to look after their children (social-conservative value alliance) and with the employers 
organisations on measures attracting them back to the labour market (cross-class coalition for 
the conciliation of work and care).    
Despite these unusual and flexible alliances on specific issues, the final reform coalitions 
nevertheless resembled the “traditional” left-right-conflict. Indeed, even though the 
conservative parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) had consented to the propositions of increasing 
educational benefit and more generous parental leave, the final vote in parliament clearly 
opposed them to the left-wing governmental parties (SPD/Greens) without any party 
fragmentation. Similarly, the trade unions were favourable to the reform, whereas the 
employers rejected it, even though they had agreed on the incentives for a rapid return of 
parents to the labour market. This case thus largely confirms the hypothesis that a rather 
adversarial institutional context of decision-making tends to realign “new” issue-alliances 
along traditional conflict lines.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
We still have to explain the anomaly that the SPD was co-opted in the reform coalition 
adopting the pension reform bill of 1992, despite the bi-polar party competition in the German 
institutional framework. This difference to the reform coalitions in the law on educational 
benefits is all the more puzzling when we consider that in 1989, when the pension reform was 
voted, the conservative government (CDU/CSU/FDP) held a (slight) majority in both 
chambers of the German parliament. Instead, in 2000, the SPD/Green government faced a 
conservative majority in the Bundesrat, which would have made a broad reform coalition in 
the parental leave reform even more plausible. How can the consent of the SPD to the pension 
reform be explained? First, there existed an informal “tradition” of consensual pension 
reforms until the 1990s (Nullmeier and Rüb 1993). The idea was that the pension system was 
of such importance that it should not be exposed to the influence of changing political 
majorities. This “tradition”, however, came to an end already in 1997, when the SPD heavily 
opposed the conservative reform. The second argument, then, is linked to this growing overall 
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polarisation in the 1990s. With the increasing budgetary pressure, a fundamental opposition 
between the major parties intensified (even though this antagonism was sometimes rather 
rhetoric, see Pierson 2001, Huber and Stephens 2001) and political exchange became more 
difficult.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, I argued that reform elements covering new social needs and demands would 
lead to the formation of new alliances in reform processes, which transform the space of 
social policy making from one- into two-dimensional, adding a value-axis to the traditional 
distributional conflict line. This hypothesis could be largely confirmed by means of the 
analysis of four reform processes in Switzerland and Germany. Modernising value coalitions 
could be observed between Social Democratic, liberal and sometimes even conservative 
parties on reform-issues such as the splitting of pension contribution benefits for husbands 
and wives, birth benefits, pension contribution credits for carers and the flexibilisation of 
parental leave organisation. Cross-class alliances between the left and employers were more 
rare, but occurred on the splitting of pension contributions, better pension protection against 
discontinuous employment biographies and on financial incentives to combine parental leave 
and part-time employment. On the other hand, the traditional left-right distributional conflicts 
could mainly be observed with respect to “old” social policy issues such as the age of 
retirement and the mode of pension indexation. Interestingly, for the social partners, these 
“old” issues remain primordial, while the parties are more sensitive to new social policy 
issues.  
These coalitional realignments tended to lead to strong intra-party fragmentation on the left 
and the right in Switzerland, while party discipline in the votes on the final reform packages 
remained generally higher in the more adversarial German system.  
 
The analysis of the reforms has further pointed out that the policies responding to new social 
needs and demands are not homogeneous, but must be differentiated. As can be observed in 
the German reform of parental leave, new social policies can be modernising in the sense of 
favouring the conciliation of work and care, or they can be modernising in rewarding 
educational and caring tasks. This difference, however, is relevant for alliance- and coalition-
formation. While employers are likely to give their consent to the former policies, the support 
of conservative parties, but not of employers, can be expected for the latter. The liberal parties 
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are located somewhat in between, sometimes adopting more conservative, sometimes more 
employer-friendly positions, whereas the left generally supports both types of modernisation. 
To a certain extent, this differentiation of new social policy issues is captured by Piersons’ 
(2001: 419ff.) distinction of three “dimensions” of contemporary welfare reform: 
recommodification, recalibration and cost containment. The problem with this categorization 
is that the three dimensions are not mutually exclusive. The provision of public child care 
infrastructure, for instance, is recalibrating (modernising), commodifying (increasing labour 
market participation) and expansive (poverty reducing) at the same time. Hence, one could 
systematically distinguish recalibrating (modernising) reforms according to whether they are 
commodifying or not (care infrastructure vs. child care benefits) and whether they are 
expansive or cost containing (parental leave vs. abolishment of widows’ pensions). While 
capital and trade unions could be expected to support rather inexpensive or even restrictive 
commodifying modernisation (potential for cross-class and social-liberal alliances), 
conservative actors would rather favour expansive modernisation that preserves traditional 
role models (potential for social-conservative alliances). Such refined categorisations of 
reform issues could further improve the understanding of coalitional dynamics in 
contemporary welfare state restructuring. 
 
Notes 
1 For the BDA (Union of German Employers), see for instance  http://www.bda-
online.de/www/bdaonline.nsf/id/ZielgruppendesArbeitsmarktes; for the SAV (Swiss 
Union of Employers Associations), see SAV (2001). Familienpolitische Plattform des 
SAV. Januar 2001. Zürich. 
2 Formally, subsidies for early retirement were cut, which equals a rise in the legal age 
of retirement.  
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Appendix : List of actors and abbreviations 
Switzerland:  
 
CNG    Christian Trade Unions (Christlichnationaler Gewerkschaftsbund) 
Economiesuisse  Union of large Swiss Employers 
EVP    Protestant People’s Party (Evangelische Volkspartei) 
EDU    Federal Democratic Union (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union) 
EKFF   Gender equality commission  (Eidg. Kommission für Frauenfragen) 
FDP    Free Democratic Party (Freiheitlich-Demokratische Partei) 
Greens   Swiss Green Party (Grüne Partei Schweiz) 
LPS    Swiss Liberal Party (Liberale Partei Schweiz) 
PDA    Workers’ Party (Partei der Arbeit) 
Pro Familia  Families’ Organisation  
Pro Juventute  Youth Organisation 
SAV    Union of Swiss Employers Associations (Schweiz. Arbeitgeberverband) 
SGB    Union of Swiss Trade Unions (Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund) 
SGV   Union of Small Swiss Employers (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband) 
SPS    Swiss Social-democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Schweiz) 
SVP    Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) 
Womens’ Organisation  (Alliance F) 
Germany:  
BDA    German Employers’ Union (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber) 
CDU/CSU   Christian-Democratic Union and Christian Social Union 
DAG   Union of German Employees (Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft) 
DBB   Union of German Civil Servants (Deutscher Beamtenbund) 
DGB   Union of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 
FDP   Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) 
Families’ Organisation (Deutscher Familienverband) 
Greens   German Green Party (Grüne) 
PDS   Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus) 
SPD   Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland) 
ULA   Union of Cadre Employees (Union Leitender Angestellter) 
Womens’ Organisation (Deutscher Frauenrat) 
ZDH   Union of Craft Employers (Zentralverband des deutschen Handwerks) 
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Figure 1: MDS of the issue-alliances in the 10th reform of the Swiss  
basic pension scheme (Stress I at 0.08)* 
 
 *List of actors and abbreviations: see appendix  
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Table 1: Reform coalitions in the 10th reform of the Swiss basic pension scheme* 
Acceptance of the reform Refusal of the reform Lifting of voting instruction 
Free Democratic Party FDP 
Swiss Liberal Party LPS  
Swiss People’s Party SVP 
Social-democratic Party SPS 
Green Party  
Christian Parties (EVP) 
Economiesuisse 
Swiss Employers Association SAV 
Union of Small Employers S GV 
Gender equality commission EKFF 
Womens’ Organisation Alliance F 
Union of Swiss Trade unions 
2 cantonal sections of the 
Social-democratic Party (GE, 
JU) 
1 cantonal section of the 
Green Party (GR) 
 
 
 
One cantonal section of the 
Social-democratic Party 
(VS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20. 06.1995 
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Figure 2: MDS of issue-alliances in the debate on the introduction of maternity  
insurance (Stress I: 0.25)* 
  
  *List of actors and abbreviations: see appendix  
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Table 2: Reform coalitions on the introduction of maternity insurance* 
Acceptance of the reform Refusal of the reform 
Christian Democratic Party CVP 
Swiss Liberal Party LPS  
Social-democratic Party SPS 
Green Party  
Protestant People’s Party EVP 
Workers’ Party (PdA) 
7 cantonal sections of the FDP  
Womens’ section of the FDP 
Two cantonal sections of the SVP  
Union of Swiss Trade Unions 
Pro Familia  
Pro Juventute 
Womens’ Organisation Alliance F 
Free Democratic Party FDP (federal party and  
19 cantonal sections) 
Swiss People’s Party SVP 
Federal Democratic Union EDU 
One cantonal section of the CVP  
Union of Small Employers SGV 
Swiss Employers Association SAV 
Christian Trade Unions 
 
 
 
*Source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 07.06.1999 
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    Figure 3: MDS of issue-alliances in the debate on the German   pension  
   reform 1992 (Stress I: 0.35)* 
 
    *List of actors and abbreviations: see appendix  
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Table 3: Reform coalitions in the German pension reform 1992* 
Acceptance of the reform Refusal of the reform 
Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social 
Union CDU/CSU 
Free Democratic Party FDP 
Social Democratic Party SPD 
German Employers’ Union BDA 
Union of Craft Employers ZDH 
Green Party 
Union of German Trade Unions DGB 
*Source: Final votes in Parliament, minutes of the parliamentary debates, press articles and statements of the associations 
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Figure 4: MDS of the issue-alliances in the reform of the German law  
on parental leave and educational benefits 2000 (Stress I at 0,37)* 
 
  *List of actors and abbreviations: see appendix  
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Table 4: Reform coalitions on the German law on parental leave and educational benefits 2000* 
Acceptance of the reform Refusal of the reform 
Social Democratic Party SPD 
Green Party  
Union of German Trade Unions DGB 
 
Christian Democratic Union and Christian 
Social Union CDU/CSU 
Free Democratic Party FDP 
Party of Democratic Socialism PDS 
German Employers’ Union BDA 
Union of Craft Employers ZDH 
*Source: Final votes in Parliament, minutes of the parliamentary debates, press articles and statements of the associations 
 
